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L. Charles Long, Jr.***
This article reviews some of the more significant cases and
legislation affecting Virginia property law over the past year.
The Virginia Supreme Court revisited a wide range of issues,
including the level of visibility to which an adverse use must
rise to establish title by adverse possession. The court also
revisited the steps that a mechanic's lienor must take in order
to protect his or her lien. Additionally, the court also explored
some new issues, such as the applicability of the rule against
perpetuities to a purchase option contained in a lease.
Meanwhile, the Virginia General Assembly continued refining
various provisions of both the Virginia Condominium Act and
the Virginia Property Owners' Association Act, the Virginia
Real Estate Time Share Act. In addition, the General Assembly
cracked open the door for consumers suffering from defective
FRT plywood by expanding the scope of parties entitled to en-
force a FRT plywood manufacturer's warranty. Other important
cases and statutes are discussed below.
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B.A., 1987, George Washington University; J.D., 1992, Columbus School of Law, Cath-
olic University of America.
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I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Adverse Possession
The issue on appeal in Calhoun v. Woods' was whether the
trial court correctly ruled that several claimants failed to estab-
lish title to three adjacent parcels of unimproved mountain land
by adverse possession. To establish title to the property by
adverse possession, the claimants had to show by clear and
convincing evidence actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and con-
tinuous possession, under a claim of right, for the statutory
period of fifteen years.2
The claimants, Henry and Katharine Calhoun, asserted that
their period of adverse possession began in 1931 when Mrs.
Calhoun's father acquired title to property adjacent to the land
at issue. The Calhouns acquired title to the property in 1966.'
Evidence produced by the Calhouns showed that from 1931
they or their predecessors used the property for "sawmill opera-
tions, logging, firewood gathering, construction and maintenance
of gates, construction and use of buildings, installation and use
of water and electricity, hunting, property posting, erection and
maintenance of fencing, husbandry, orchardry, recreational
activities, conservation activities, occupation and leasing, and
construction and maintenance of roads."4 The record, however,
did not indicate whether the disputed property was used for
these purposes or the time and duration of the uses.5 For ex-
ample, three small buildings built in connection with the mill
were abandoned when the mill ceased operations after two
years.6
Reviewing its past decisions, the court noted that all pre-
sumptions favor the holder of legal title to the disputed land,'
1. 246 Va. 41, 431 S.E.2d 285 (1993).
2. Id. at 43, 431 S.E.2d at 286-87 (citing Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61, 400
S.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1991)).
3. Id. at 45, 431 S.E.2d at 287.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 46, 431 S.E.2d at 288.
7. Id. at 44, 431 S.E.2d at 287 (citing Matthews v. W.T. Freeman Co., 191 Va.
385, 395, 60 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1950) (ruling that the burden of proving all elements of
adverse possession is on the party asserting title, as all presumptions favor the title-
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and that wild and uncultivated land cannot be made subject to
adverse possession without a cognizable change in its condi-
tion.' As a result, although the claimants presented some evi-
dence of their use of the disputed property during the statutory
period, the court viewed the evidence as insufficient to provide
notice of a hostile and adverse claim.9
B. Condemnation
In Jenkins v. County of Shenandoah, ° Jenkins and adjacent
landowners sued the county to recover for property damage
arising from storm water drainage that backed onto their lands
out of a county-owned drainage facility. The facility had been
approved by and dedicated to the county concurrently with the
development of a residential subdivision. The county, however,
failed to maintain the facility. The trial court upheld the
county's two-part defense: first, the county had no duty to
maintain the facility, and second, the lawsuit was barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." The Virginia Supreme Court
overruled the lower court on both counts.
First, the court disposed of the sovereign immunity defense,
citing Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia,
which prohibits the General Assembly from enacting any law
that enables private property to be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation to the landowner. 2 This self-
operating section permits a landowner to enforce his constitu-
tional rights in a common law action "where his property is
holder)).
8. Id. (citing Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Wickline, 126 Va. 223, 233, 101 S.E. 225,
229 (1919) (holding that the periodic cutting and sale of timber on undeveloped land
does not effect a cognizable change in condition)).
9. Id. at 46, 431 S.E.2d at 288.
10. 246 Va. 467, 436 S.E.2d 607 (1993).
11. Id. at 468-69, 436 S.E.2d at 608.
12. Id.; see VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; see also Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 218
Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1977) (holding that landowners may recover for
property damage based upon implied contract in the absence of valid eminent domain
law); Morris v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 203 Va. 196, 197, 123 S.E.2d 398, 399
(1962) (finding that owner of property damaged by state construction of river tunnel
district was entitled to just compensation); Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 196
Va. 477, 481, 84 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1954) (ruling that a right of recovery exists for
damage done to property by the governmene's exercise of eminent domain).
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taken for public uses and where it is damaged for public uses,
irrespective of... negligence in the taking or the damage.""
The court noted that it previously held landowners' actions
under Article I, Section 11 to be contract actions, not tort ac-
tions, and accordingly, were not barred by the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity. 4
The Virginia Supreme Court then turned to the county's
assertion that the landowners failed to present a case for com-
pensation from inverse condemnation. As basis for this claim,
the county stated it had never taken any actions to maintain,
construct, supervise or operate the drainage easements. In re-
sponse, the court cited the facts in Burns, which were similar
to the facts in the instant case. There, as here, the drainage
system was dedicated to the board of supervisors and the board
accepted the dedication." Also, in Burns the system damaged
abutting properties. The only distinction, which the court dis-
missed as irrelevant, was that in the instant case, the drainage
system fell into disrepair." The court then noted that in Burns
an inference arose that the drainage system was used for a
public purpose because the board of supervisors, as a public
body, can only acquire property for a public purpose. The
court then jumped to the conclusion that when the board of
supervisors accepted the dedication of the easement, it also
accepted the burden of maintaining the easement to protect the
subservient properties. Therefore, the landowners had made a
prima facie case of inverse condemnation, and the case was
remanded for further action by the lower court."
In Board of Supervisors v. Parsons,9  Prince William
County's appetite proved bigger than its stomach. The county
condemned 117.83 acres owned by the Parsons family which
initially was to be used to expand the county's landfill and lat-
er, as a public park. The county's valuation of the land was
13. Jenkins, 246 Va. at 470, 436 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Heldt, 196 Va. at 482, 84
S.E.2d at 514) (emphasis in original).
14. Id. (citing Burns, 218 Va. at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825).
15. Id. (citing Burns, 218 Va. at 626, 238 S.E.2d at 824).
16. Id. at 471, 436 S.E.2d at 610.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 245 Va. 489, 428 S.E.2d 905 (1993).
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initially $1,895,000,2o but the commissioners valued it much
higher in two proceedings. In the second trial the value was
fixed by the commissioners at $3,425,000.21 The circuit court
confirmed the award in August 1991, and its order provided
that "the execution of this order shall be suspended pending the
appeal of this matter to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and
shall be suspended until all appeals are finally disposed of."'
In March, 1992, the county filed a motion to withdraw the
condemnation proceedings and to pay the Parsons their expens-
es. The county believed that because of the excessive price, the
purposes for which it had sought to acquire the property were
frustrated.2
The Virginia Supreme Court then considered whether a con-
demnor has the right under Virginia Code section 25-46.34(b) 4
to withdraw a condemnation proceeding after the lapse of the
thirty-day period for the filing of a notice of appeal fixed in
Rule 5:9(a).' First, the court summarily dismissed the county's
assertion that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary,
eminent domain permits a condemnor who has not taken title
to the land to withdraw at any time during the pendency of an
appeal from the commissioner's ruling.2 The court also noted
that Code section 25-46.34(b) specifically addresses that is-
20, Id. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 906. The landowners asserted a value of
$59,100,000. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 906-07.
23. Id. at 492, 428 S.E.2d at 907.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.34(b) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
25. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:9(a).
26. Parsons, 245 Va. at 493, 428 S.E.2d at 907.
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sue.27 The Virginia Supreme Court concluded this part of its
analysis by holding:
[t]he General Assembly has provided that a condemnor's
right to withdraw eminent domain proceedings expires upon
the lapse of 30 days following entry of the "final order upon
a report of just compensation." At that time, if a condemnor
has not exercised its right to note an appeal, the respective
rights of the parties vest, title passes to the condemnor, and
the landowner becomes entitled to payment of the award.
The court went on to analyze whether the August 1991 order
was "final." The county argued that the withdrawal period had
not run because the August 1991 order had been "suspended
simultaneously with its entry," and that this suspension provi-
sion had "extended the time for the Board to exercise its legis-
lative discretion to withdrawal."' The final order, according to
the county, did not occur until the court denied the Board's
petition for appeal.3 0
After analyzing Virginia Code sections 25-46.26"' and 25-
46.31(d), 2 the court concluded (somewhat tautologically) that
"the final order in this case provided that 'the execution of the
order shall be suspended pending the appeal.' Supersedeas
affects only the enforceability, not the finality, of an appealable
27. Id.
Manifestly, Code § 25-46.34(b) provides that after commencement of a
just compensation hearing, a petitioner that has not acquired a vested
interest in the property ... has a privilege, 'as a matter of right,' to
withdraw the petition if it does so 'before the time for noting an appeal
from any final order upon a report of just compensation.' The time for
noting an appeal is '30 days after entry of the final judgment or other
appealable order or decree.'
Id. The court also noted the difference between other jurisdictions and Virginia with
respect to the appeal period. For example, see MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-109
(1992) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-35 (West Cum. Supp. 1992) which permit the con-
demnor to withdraw its case until after it has lost an appeal to a higher court. In
Virginia, the statute limits the right to withdraw the proceeding at a point before the
time for noting an appeal. See Parsons, 245 Va. at 493-94, 428 S.E.2d at 908.
28. Parsons, 245 Va. at 494, 428 S.E.2d at 908.
29. Id. at 494-95, 428 S.E.2d at 908.
30. Id. at 495, 428 S.E.2d at 908.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.26 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
32. Id. § 25-46.31(d).
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order."' Finally, the court modified the circuit court's order
regarding the moment from which interest in favor of the land-
owner is to run to thirty days after entry of the final order,
that being the instant when the respective rights of the parties
vest.'
A condemnation certificate does not constitute a continuing
offer to purchase, explained the Virginia Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Transportation Commission v. Klotz, Inc.' Up-
on receiving an unfavorable environmental report on the two
parcels of land affected by the certificate, Klotz, the owner of
the parcels, notified the commissioner in writing that he accept-
ed the commissioner's $15,190 value for the parcels set forth in
the certificate. The commissioner, however, subsequently sought
to amend the certificate to take fee simple title to only one
parcel, an easement over the other and reduce the value of the
parcels to $71.38 The trial court held that the certificate con-
stituted a continuing offer to purchase and denied the
commissioner's request to amend the certificate. 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia's strict construction of Virgin-
ia Code section 33.1-122' precluded treating Klotz's acceptance
letter as an agreement between the parties as to the value of
33. Parsons, 245 Va. at 495, 428 S.E.2d at 909 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 496, 428 S.E.2d at 909 (citing Bartz v. Bd. of Supervisors, 237 Va. 669,
672, 379 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1989) (stating that an interest on compensation award is
appropriate for time periods during which condemnor has "taken" the property and
the land owner has not yet been paid)).
35. 245 Va. 101, 425 S.E.2d 508 (1993).
36. Id. at 103-04, 428 S.E.2d at 510.
37. Id. at 104, 425 S.E.2d at 510.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-122 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994). Section 33.1-
122 provides, in part, that:
The certificate of the Commissioner shall be recorded in the clerk's office
of the court where deeds are recorded. Upon such recordation, the inter-
est or estate of the owner of such property shall terminate and the title
to such property or interest or estate ofthe owner shall be vested in the
Commonwealth and such owner shall have such interest or estate in the
funds held on deposit by virtue of the certificate as he had in the prop-
erty taken or damaged, and all liens by deed of trust, judgment or other-
wise upon such property or estate or interest shall be transferred to such
funds. The title in the Commonwealth shall be defeasible until the reach-
ing of an agreement between the Commissioner and such owner, as pro-
vided in § 33.1-129, or the compensation determined by condemnation
proceedings as hereinafter provided.
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the parcels. The letter was merely an indication of his willing-
ness to settle the matter for a set amount.39 Absent some oth-
er agreement between the parties, the trial court erred in hold-




The Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the plain-
tiffs produced sufficient evidence of fraud to support a jury's
award of damages in the amount of $8,000 in Thompson v.
Bacon.4 Shortly after the Bacons purchased a house from the
Thompsons, the basement flooded after a heavy rainfall. The
Bacons claimed that the Thompsons fraudulently concealed evi-
dence of water damage in the basement of the house.2
The court considered the following evidence. First, the Bacons
viewed the house twice prior to purchasing it. In addition, a
home inspection report prepared on behalf of the Bacons dis-
closed evidence of past dampness in the basement, but no evi-
dence of water damage.' Also, three water leakage experts
testified at trial that the basement showed evidence of prior
water damage, but they were unable to describe the location of
such evidence in the basement.' Furthermore, when the
Thompsons moved out of the house, they left furniture blocking
the area that the Bacons claimed was damaged by the flood.
The Thompsons, however, established that the furniture had
been located in the same place for the four years that they
owned the house.'
The owners of the house prior to the Thompsons testified
that the basement had flooded after a heavy snow, but that
they repaired the water leakage problem. Consequently, the
previous owners did not inform the Thompsons of the flooding.
Additionally, the contractor who installed new carpeting in the
39. Klotz, 245 Va. at 106, 425 S.E.2d at 511.
40. Id.
41. 245 Va. 107, 425 S.E.2d 512 (1993).
42. Id. at 108, 425 S.E.2d at 513.
43. Id. at 109, 425 S.E.2d at 513.
44. Id. at 110, 425 S.E.2d at 513.
45. Id. at 109, 425 S.E.2d at 513.
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basement for the Bacons testified that the pad under the carpet
did not appear to have water damage and was, in fact, reused
by the contractor."
The court held that the Bacons failed to prove that the
Thompsons had any knowledge of any water damage.47 In ad-
dition, the court did not find that the Thompsons' alleged mis-
representation had any causal relationship with the damages
suffered by the Bacons.'
In a matter involving the interpretation of a purchase con-
tract subject to several conditions precedent, the Virginia Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in Vega v.
Chattan Associates, Inc.4" In November of 1989, Chattan Asso-
ciates agreed to purchase a tract of land from Vega and
Lamay,e conditioned upon "the obtaining of financing ac-
ceptable to" Chattan.5 The purchase contract further provided
that "'[i]n the event [the] contract is declared null and void due
to [certain] circumstances . .. ' Sellers will reimburse [Chattan],
for the deposits it had paid and 'any other costs' it might have
incurred in preparation for improving the land."52
A dispute arose when Chattan notified Vega and Lamay of
Chattan's inability to obtain suitable financing and demanded
the return of its deposit money and reimbursement of incurred
improvement costs.' Vega and the Lamays contended that
46. Id. at 110, 425 S.E.2d at 514.
47. Id. at 111, 425 S.E.2d at 514.
48. Id. at 112, 425 S.E.2d at 515.
49. 246 Va. 196, 435 S.E.2d 142 (1993).
50. Id. at 197-98, 435 S.E.2d at 143. The tract contained approximately two acres
composed of one parcel owned by Guillermina Vega and another owned by Russell
and Yvonne Lamay. Id.
51. Id. at 198, 435 S.E.2d at 143 (quoting the purchase contract).
52. Id. The "null and void clause" of the contract provided:
In the event this contract is declared null and void due to circumstances
which hold the Purchaser not in default, as provided for elsewhere in
this contract, Sellers will reimburse Purchaser for all monies disbursed
by Purchaser for Lot purchase, and, as provided for elsewhere in this
contract, for any other costs necessary to obtain Fairfax County approval
of a five (5) bedroom percolation site and survey and engineering costs
incurred to sub-divide and record subject lot. Purchaser is to be reim-
bursed within one hundred and twenty (120) days of this contract being
declared null and void.
Id. at 199, 435 S.E.2d at 144.
53. Id. at 198, 435 S.E.2d at 143.
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Chattan was barred from recovery under the contract because
the contract became null and void for failure of the condition
precedent relating to financing.'
Upon analyzing the contract language, the court found that
the parties intended the deposit and cost reimbursement provi-
sion to be severable and to survive the termination of the con-
tract for failure of a condition precedent.55 The court further
observed that the financing contingency was identified in the
contract as a condition that, if not satisfied, would not hold
Chattan in default. Chattan, consequently, would be permitted
to declare the contract null and void and trigger the refund and
reimbursement provision."
In Christopher Associates v. Sessoms,57 the Supreme Court of
Virginia was asked to construe the liquidated damages provi-
sion of a contract for the sale of real property. Sessoms agreed
to sell a 132 acre parcel to Christopher Associates. The sales
contract required the purchaser to post a $10,000 deposit upon
execution of the contract and the additional sum of $40,000
upon successfully re-zoning the property to permit the develop-
ment of a residential subdivision.' The purchaser obtained the
appropriate zoning but did not post the additional sum of
$40,000. The purchaser subsequently defaulted on its obligation
to purchase the property. 9
The seller sued the purchaser for the additional sum of
$40,000 claiming that the $40,000 constituted part of the depos-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 199, 435 S.E.2d at 143. The court opined that "[t]o read the contract
otherwise would render the deposit-refund and cost-reimbursement provision meaning-
less." Id.; see also Ames v. American Natl Bank, 163 Va. 1, 39, 176 S.E. 204, 216
(1934) (holding that a contract is to be read as a whole and no word or phrase is to
be treated as meaningless if any reasonable meaning consistent with the rest of the
contract can be given to it).
56. 246 Va. at 201, 435 S.E.2d at 144-45.
57. 245 Va. 18, 425 S.E.2d 795 (1993).
58. Id. at 19-20, 425 S.E.2d at 796. The liquidated damages provision stated:
If on or before the date of closing, Buyer shall default in the payment of
the purchase price or shall otherwise default in the performance of any
of the other terms of this Contract, Seller shall retain the Deposit as
liquidated damages, as its sole and exclusive remedy against Buyer.




it the purchaser was obligated to post.' The court disagreed,
holding that the contract allowed the seller to retain only the
$10,000 actually posted by the purchaser.6 The seller could
not "retain" the $40,000, the court noted, because it was never
paid by the purchaser.62
D. Deeds
In Hanson v. Harding,' Floyd Diehl's heirs challenged the
validity of a deed of gift purporting to convey Diehl's home to
his daughter, Frances Hanson. DieM executed the deed, which
was prepared by Hanson's attorney, in a nursing home in the
presence of Hanson, her husband, and the nursing home admin-
istrator in her capacity as a notary. Witnesses for the heirs
testified that after Diehl executed the deed of gift he made
statements to the effect that he intended to return to his home
after leaving the nursing home and that he wanted all of his
children to share in his property after his death. Diehl did not
tell anyone that he had executed the deed to Hanson.'
The heirs sought to overturn the deed on two grounds. First,
the heirs claimed that Hanson procured the deed by fraud.
Second, the heirs alleged that there was no effective delivery of
the deed.' The court noted that had the heirs presented evi-
dence (1) that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed be-
tween Diehl and Hanson, (2) that the consideration for the deed
was grossly inadequate, and (3) that Diehl suffered from "great
weakness of mind," the heirs could have created a presumption
of fraud." That presumption would have shifted to Hanson the
burden of producing evidence of the deed's validity. 7 The re-
cord, however, indicated that Diehl was aware of what he was
doing. Therefore, the heirs retained the burden of proving fraud
60. Id.
61. Id. at 22, 425 S.E.2d at 797.
62. Id. at 23, 425 S.E.2d at 797.
63. 245 Va. 424, 429 S.E.2d 20 (1993).
64. Id. at 426, 429 S.E.2d at 21.
65. Id. at 427, 429 S.E.2d at 22.
66. Id. at 426, 429 S.E.2d at 21.
67. Id.
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by clear and convincing evidence, which, based on the evidence
in the record, they failed to do.'
With respect to the heirs' claim that the deed was not effec-
tively delivered to Hanson, the court noted that Diehl's state-
ments regarding his intent to return home after leaving the
nursing home and statements made by Hanson that she did not
think that she would own the property until her father's death,
were not inconsistent with the creation of a life estate in favor
of Diehl and a present intent to convey to Hanson fee simple
title to the property. 9 In addition, statements made by Diehl
after executing the deed that he wanted all of his children to
share in his property were not inconsistent with his intent to
convey the property to Hanson at the time Diehl executed the
deed. These facts failed to overcome the presumption of a valid
delivery arising when a grantee is in possession of a duly exe-
cuted deed."
In Richardson v. Parris," the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether a purchaser at a tax sale was entitled to an
allowance for improvements to the property where the tax sale
was based on a facially defective affidavit. 2 The Parris family
failed to pay real estate taxes on their unimproved lot. The
county proceeded against them by order of publication, mistak-
enly believing that they were not residents of the Common-
wealth. At the time of the suit, however, the Parris family
resided in Springfield, Virginia.73 Richardson bought the prop-
erty at the judicial sale for $2,200."'
The Parris family successfully challenged the sale, claiming
that an affidavit filed with the court regarding their residence
rendered the order of publication void and that they were not
effectively subjected to the jurisdiction of the court authorizing
the sale. 5 Richardson filed an application pursuant to section
68. Id. at 428, 429 S.E.2d at 22.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 246 Va. 203, 435 S.E.2d 389 (1993).
72. Id. at 204, 435 S.E.2d at 390.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court noted that pursuant to § 8.01-316(lXaXiii) of
the Virginia Code, a successful order of publication requires the claimant to file an
1112
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8.01-166 of the Virginia Code requesting an allowance for the
improvements he made to the property subsequent to the judi-
cial sale."6
The court held that Richardson's constructive notice of the
faulty affidavit, a matter of record in the judicial sale, prohibit-
ed Richardson's recovery under section 8.01-166." "Interpreting
the predecessor to Code § 8.01-166, this Court has said that in
order to be a bona fide purchaser, the belief in the validity of
the title must be founded on ignorance of fact, not ignorance of
law.""8 Richardson had a duty to inquire into the validity of
the sale. Had he done so, he would have discovered that the
affidavit was faulty on its face, and that the court lacked juris-
diction. 9
E. Joint Tenants
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Overby v. White' was whether property interests of a tenant
in common can be affected by a deed of trust executed by a co-
tenant."s The matter was brought before the court by Lisa
Dawn Overby, the owner of an undivided one-fourth interest in
property once owned by her mother, Aeleen Brooks Holley, and
her deceased father as tenants by the entirety82 Aeleen and
Overby's father divorced. Aeleen subsequently remarried and
titled her interest in the property in herself and Paul, her new
husband, as tenants by the entirety.' After Lisa Overby and
affidavit stating that the party to be served "is" not a resident of the state, not "may
not be" as was stated in the affidavit in the present case. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
316(lXaXiii) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
76. Richardson, 246 Va. at 206, 435 S.E.2d at 391. Section 8.01-166 permits a
recovery for improvements when the person who made the improvements held the
land believing his title to be good. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-166 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
77. 246 Va. at 206, 435 S.E.2d at 391. "We have stated .. . that a person with
notice, actual or constructive, of infirmity in the title cannot recover for improve-
ments." Id. (citing White v. Pleasants, 227 Va. 508, 515, 317 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1984)).
78. Id. at 207, 435 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Kan v. Kefalogiannis, 158 Va. 129, 134,
163 S.E. 535, 536 (1932) (holding that notice of title defect is imputable to purchaser
where defect is matter of record)).
79. Id.
80. 245 Va. 446, 429 S.E.2d 17 (1993).
81. Id. at 447. 429 S.E.2d at 18.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 448, 429 S.E.2d at 18.
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her sister filed suit, the status of title to the property was as
follows: Lisa and her sister each owned an undivided one-quar-
ter interest in the property as tenants in common. Aeleen and
Paul owned a one-half undivided interest as tenants in common
with Overby and her sister and as tenants by the entirety as
between themselves.'
When Paul and Aeleen Holley signed a promissory note se-
cured by a deed of trust on the property, Overby asked the
court to declare their respective interests in the property. The
substitute trustee under the deed of trust securing the note
petitioned to intervene in the suit to determine "the state of
title of [the] property and the extent and priority of the ...
[d]eed of [t]rust."'
The court held that Aeleen and Paul could not impair the
property rights of Overby when they signed the deed of trust
and the deed of trust note because Overby neither executed nor
authorized anyone to execute the documents on her behalf.
Additionally, the court held that a trustee under a deed of trust
that encumbers real property held in tenancy in common is not
entitled to place a constructive trust on the property over the
objection of a co-tenant who has not signed the note or deed of
trust." The court found no fraud or injustice attributable to
Overby that would give rise to a constructive trust."
F. Landlord and Tenant
The issue addressed in Marina Shores, Ltd v. Cohn-Phillips,
Ltd.s" was whether the provisions of a lease avoided the neces-
sity of complying with the five day pay-or-quit language in
section 55-225 of the Virginia Code." The lease required pay-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 449, 429 S.E.2d at 19.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 246 Va. 222, 435 S.E.2d 136 (1993).
90. Id. at 223, 435 S.E.2d at 137. Section 55-225 provides in part, that:
[i]f any tenant or lessee of premises in a city or town . . . , being in
default in the payment of rent, shall so continue for five days after no-
tice, in writing, requiring possession of the premises or the payment of
rent, such tenant or lessee shall thereby forfeit his right to the posses-
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ment of rent, without demand, on the first of each month for
the prior month, and provided that nonpayment of rent consti-
tuted a default under and breach of the lease."1 The lease fur-
ther stated that in the event of default, the lessor could termi-
nate the possessory rights of the lessee by any lawful means. 2
When the lessee failed to pay the rent due on May 1 and
June 1, counsel for the lessor wrote a letter to the lessee termi-
nating the lease. Upon receipt of the letter on June 3, the les-
see tendered the delinquent rent, which the lessor refused to
accept.1
3
The trial court held that the lessor was required to comply
with the five-day notice requirement contained in section 55-
225.' The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed stating that the
clear and unambiguous default and remedies provisions of the
lease governed the disposition of the case.95 Accordingly, the
sion. In such case the possession of the defendant may, at the option of
the landlord or lessor, be deemed unlawful, and he may proceed to recov-
er [possession].
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-225 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
91. 246 Va. at 224, 435 S.E.2d at 138.
92. Id. at 224-25, 435 S.E.2d at 137-38. Paragraph 11 of the lease specifically
provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Defaults. The occurrence of any one or more of the following
events shall constitute a default and breach of the Lease by [Cohn Phil-
lips]:
(2) The failure by [Cohn Phillips] to make any payment of
rent... as and when due.
(b) Remedies. In the event of any such default or breach by [Cohn
Phillips], [Marina Shores] may at any time thereafter, with or without
notice or demand and without limiting [Marina Shores] in the exercise of
any right or remedy which may have by reason of such default or
breach:
(1) Terminate [Cohn Phillips's] right to possession of the Premis-
es by any lawful means, in which case this Lease shall terminate and
[Cohn Phillips] shall immediately surrender possession of the Premises
to [Marina Shores].
Id.
93. Id. at 225, 435 S.E.2d at 138.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see Marriott Corp. v. Combined Properties, 239 Va. 506, 512, 391 S.E.2d
313, 316 (1990) (ruling that the terms of a clear and unambiguous contract will be
given their ordinary plain meaning); Winn v. Aleda Const. Co., 227 Va. 304, 307, 315
S.E.2d 193, 194 (1984) (stating that the contract pf the parties becomes the law of
the case unless it is repugnant to some rule of law or public policy).
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court held that the lessee's nonpayment of rent constituted a
default and breach of the lease that entitled the lessor to termi-
nate the lease.' The court also determined that the notifica-
tion letter sent by the lessor's attorney to the lessee was a
lawful means of terminating the lease, notwithstanding the fact
that the letter did not comply with section 55-225."7
In Wells v. Shoosmith," the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered whether successors to a landlord's interest in property
subject to two existing leases met their burden of proving the
invalidity of the lease descriptions so as to render the two leas-
es unenforceable.'
By deed dated January 7, 1964, a special commissioner "on
behalf of the Commonwealth, conveyed 66 acres of
marshland.., to Lewis S. Pendleton, Jr.""° Approximately
9.74 acres of the 66 acres conveyed were part of a 441.64-acre
farm owned by John Lofton Johnson.10 On July 25, 1980,
Johnson executed a fifty-year lease of the 9.74 acres with Wil-
liam A. Wells and others referring to the area as "that certain
marsh belonging to the [Johnsons], but claimed by Louis [sic]
Pendleton." °2 In 1982, the Johnsons executed a second lease
with Wells permitting him to hunt on "the marsh located on
the Appomattox River between the high land of the [Johnsons]
and the marsh claimed by Louis [sic] Pendleton, along with the
marsh bordering on Johnson Creek." "°( Shoosmith Brothers
acquired the Johnson property in 1990 subject to the two exist-
ing leases, and subsequently conveyed the property to Jack and
Nina Shoosmith. The Shoosmiths thereafter brought a proceed-
ing in equity, claiming that the Wells leases were invalid for
lack of sufficient land descriptions and lack of valid consider-
ation. ' 4
96. 246 Va. at 226, 435 S.E.2d at 138.
97. Id.
98. 245 Va. 386, 428 S.E.2d 909 (1993).
99. Id. at 387, 428 S.E.2d at 910.
100. Id. at 388, 428 S.E.2d at 910. The land was characterized as "waste and
unappropriated" land subject to sale under § 41.1-16 of the Virginia Code. Id. at 388,
428 S.E.2d at 911.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 389, 428 S.E.2d at 911.
104. Id. at 389, 392, 428 S.E.2d at 911, 913.
1116
PROPERTY LAW
The court denied the Shoosmiths' claim, noting that a legal
description "is not [provided] to identify the land, but to furnish
means of identification.""5 The court further determined that
the Shoosmiths were charged with knowledge of all facts that a
diligent inquiry would have disclosed as to the property refer-
ring to both the Pendleton deed, which contained a plat, and
the lease descriptions, which referred to the deed. Both the
deed and lease also were duly recorded."° The court also held
that property owners who purchase property subject to leases,
having only privity of estate, lack standing to challenge the
validity of leases absent privity of contract."°7
In an analogous case involving the sufficiency of a lease de-
scription, Sovran Bank, NA. v. Creative Industries, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a contract of sale did not
create a leasehold estate because it failed to identify the leased
premises with reasonable certainty."° Creative Industries oc-
cupied the property subject to dispute when it was sold at a
foreclosure sale by Sovran Bank."° The contract of sale pro-
vided, in pertinent part, that the owner and grantor under the
deed of trust would "lease to [Creative Industries] approximate-
ly 3,088 sq. feet of office space for a period of one year...
[although it] may not be the space currently occupied by [Cre-
ative Industries].""' The contract of sale was entered into pri-
or to the recordation of Sovran's deed of trust."'
Applying well-settled Virginia law," the court found that
the lease provision in the contract was insufficient to create the
leasehold estate because the subject property consisted of two
105. Id. at 391, 428 S.E.2d at 912; (citing Midkiff v. Glass, 139 Va. 218, 123 S.E.
329 (1924) (holding that land described as "located in the Staunton Magisterial Dis-
trict and is adjoining the land of a brother of the purchaser" was an adequate de-
scription)); see infra text accompanying notes 95-100; Cf. Sovran Bank v. Creative
Ind., 245 Va. 93, 95-96, 425 S.E.2d 504, 508 (1993) (holding that descriptions must be
sufficient to identify the property with reasonable certainty).
106. 245 Va. at 391, 428 S.E.2d at 912-13.
107. Id. at 392, 428 S.E.2d at 913 (citations omitted).
108. 245 Va. 93, 425 S.E.2d 504 (1993).
109. Id. at 94, 425 S.E.2d at 505.
110. Id. at 95, 425 S.E.2d at 506.
111. Id. at 94, 425 S.E.2d at 505.
112. Id. at 96, 425 S.E.2d at 506; see Chesapeake Corp. v. McCreery, 216 Va. 33,
37, 216 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1975) (ruling that a deed conveying land must contain a de-
scription sufficient to identify it within reasonable certainty).
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separate parcels, and the lease failed to state which property
was the subject of the lease."'
In Cavalier Square Ltd. v. ABC Board,"4 the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether a lessee was relieved of
paying rent on the ground of constructive eviction. The lessee
vacated the premises and assigned its rights and obligations
under its sixteen-year lease with the lessor to a third party.
Upon learning of the assignment, the lessor advised the lessee
and the assignee that the lessee was in breach of the lease due
to the lessee's vacation of the premises and attempted assign-
ment of the lease."' The lessor also warned that it would in-
stitute legal action to prevent the assignee's unauthorized activ-
ities on the premises."' The lessee denied that it owed any
rent under the lease, asserting that the lessor's actions in "in-
terfere[ing] with and block[ing]" its right to sublease the de-
mised premises constituted a constructive eviction and relieved
the lessee of its obligations under the lease."'
The court held that to constitute constructive eviction, the
lessee must completely abandon "the demised premises within a
reasonable time after intentional conduct by the lessor perma-
nently deprives the lessee, or its assignee, of the beneficial
enjoyment of the premises.""8 The court also noted that "an
assignment of a lease does not relieve the lessee of its liability
under the lease even when the lessor consents to the assign-
ment.""
9
In this instance, no constructive eviction occurred because
neither the lessee nor its assignee abandoned the premises
within a reasonable time following notice from the lessor,"0
and because the lessee failed to show that the lessor acted in
bad faith when it threatened to resort to legal process, or that
113. Creative Industries, 245 Va. at 95, 425 S.E.2d at 506.
114. 246 Va. 227, 435 S.E.2d 392 (1993).
115. Id. at 229-30, 435 S.E.2d at 394.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 231, 435 S.E.2d at 395.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see Jones v. Dokos Enter., 233 Va. 555, 557, 357 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1987).
120. Cavalier Square, 246 Va. at 232, 435 S.E.2d at 395.
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such action permanently deprived the lessee or the assignee of
the beneficial enjoyment of the premises."'
G. Mechanic's Liens
In Vansant and Gusler, Inc. v. Washington,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether or not section 43-13 of the
Virginia Code' created a private right of action for damages.
Vansant and Gusler, Inc., a subcontractor, sued Washington,
the general contractor, and its officers to recover damages for'
work it performed on behalf of the general contractor on several
projects. The subcontractor claimed that the general contractor
received payment for all or almost all of the work performed by
the subcontractor, but failed to pay the funds to the subcontrac-
tor as required by section 43-13.'
The general contractor's officers argued that section 43-13
imposed no civil liability on the part of the general contractor
or its officers.' The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed, noting
121. Id.
122. 245 Va. 356, 429 S.E.2d 31 (1993).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-13 (Repl. Vol. 1990). Section 43-13 states:
Any contractor, subcontractor or owner-developer ... or any officer, di-
rector or employee of such contractor, subcontractor or owner-developer
who shall, with intent to defraud, retain or use the funds, or any part
thereof, paid by the owner or his agent, the contractor or lender to such
contractor or by the owner or his agent, the contractor or lender to a
subcontractor under any contract for the construction, removal, repair or
improvement of any building or structure permanently annexed to the
freehold, for any other purpose than to pay persons performing labor'
upon or furnishing material for such construction, repair, removal or
improvement, shall be guilty of larceny in appropriating such funds for
any other use while any amount for which the contractor or subcontrac-
tor, or owner-developer may be liable or become liable under his contract
for such labor or materials remains unpaid, and may be prosecuted upon
complaint of any person or persons who have not been fully paid any
amount due them. The use by any such contractor or subcontractor or
any officer, director or employee of such contractor or subcontractor of
any moneys paid under the contract, before paying all amounts due or to
become due for labor performed or material furnished for such building
or structure, for any other purpose than paying such amounts, shall be
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.
Id.
124. 245 Va. at 359, 429 S.E.2d at 32.
125. Id.
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that nothing in the section expressly provided the subcontractor
with a private right of action."
Does a shipment of parts requested to replace lost or stolen
parts previously delivered entitle the supplier to extend the
time for filing materialmen's liens? This was one of three issues
considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia in American Stan-
dard Homes Corp. v. Reinecke.27 The second issue included
whether the claimant was entitled to claim the legal rate of
interest or the interest rate set forth in the contract." The
final issue was whether the claimant could collect attorney's
fees incurred by enforcing the lien."
American Standard agreed to sell to C.D.H. Corporation pre-
fabricated homes pursuant to a general contract describing the
materials available for purchase and the sales price of each
item. The parties entered into a material order contract for
each separate dwelling setting forth the particular materials
required for that project, including any extras. Each material
order contract included an exclusive agreement provision."0
The material order contract obligated C.D.H. to pay American
Standard interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum on
any payment thirty days overdue and its costs of collection,
126. Id. at 359-60, 429 S.E.2d at 33. The court rejected the subcontractor's argu-
ment that Virginia Code section 8.01-221, read in conjunction with section 43-13,
created a private right of action in favor of the subcontractor. Id.
It is very evident that the purpose of section [8.01-221] was merely to
preserve to any injured person the right to maintain his action for the
injury he may have sustained by reason of the wrong-doing of another,
and to prevent the wrong-doer from setting up the defence [sic] that he
had paid the penalty of his wrong-doing under a penal statute. It cannot
be supposed that, in enacting section [8.01-221], the Legislature had the
remotest idea of creating any new ground for bringing an action for dam-
ages.
245 Va. at 360, 429 S.E.2d at 33 (quoting Connelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100
Va. 51, 62-63, 40 S.E. 618, 622 (1902) (holding that the historic provision of law was
created to preserve the right to maintain action against wrongdoer, and not to create
a new ground for bringing an action for damages)).
127. 245 Va. 113, 425 S.E.2d 515 (1993).
128. Id. at 121, 425 S.E.2d at 519.
129. Id. at 123, 425 S.E.2d at 520.
130. Id. at 116, 425 S.E.2d at 516. The entire contractual provision stated, "This is
THE COMPLETE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. There are no written or
oral agreements or understandings directly or indirectly connected with this agree-
ment that are not incorporated herein unless they are put in writing, signed by the
parties and attached hereto." Id.
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including attorney's fees of twenty-five percent of the amount
owed.131 American Standard shipped materials for each sepa-
rate project in two parts. The first shipment contained the dry-
wall, framing, and other structural materials. The second ship-
ment included the trim package."2
American Standard filed memoranda of mechanic's liens
against twenty-seven properties after C.D.H. discontinued oper-
ations and left a number of homes in various stages of comple-
tion." Evidence produced before the commissioner appointed
in the enforcement action showed that American Standard
shipped material to six projects more than ninety days after the
last day of the month during which materials described in the
materials order contract were shipped."M American Standard
claimed that the delivery of these materials extended the date
by which it could file valid liens for the materials shipped pur-
suant to the material order contracts." C.D.H. purchased
these materials to replace lost, stolen, or damaged materials
previously shipped by American Standard.'
The court rejected American Standard's argument that the
purchase orders for the replacement materials, along with the
material order contract for each project, constituted one con-
tract.'37 The court found that the purchase orders for the re-
placement parts were separate from the material order con-
tracts. American Standard was not required to provide the




134. Id. at 117, 425 S.E.2d at 516-17.
135. Id. at 117, 425 S.E.2d at 517. Section 43-4, in effect at the time, provided:
A general contract, or any other lien claimant... in order to perfect the
lien given by § 43-3, shall file . . . not later than ninety days from the
last day of the month in which he last . . .furnishes material . . . a
memorandum showing... the amount and consideration of his claim,
and the time or times when the same is or will be due and payable,
verified by the oath of the claimant.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43.4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
The court observed that "a lien created by § 43-3 is one in derogation of the
common law." 245 Va. at 119, 425 S.E.2d at 518 (citing Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572,
576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989) (examining the validity of a road builders perfected
mechanic's lien)).
136. 245 Va. at 120, 425 S.E.2d at 518.
137. Id.
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was CDH required to purchase the replacement materials from
American Standard. American Standard satisfied its obligations
under the material order contracts when it shipped the struc-
tural and trim packages for each project."
With respect to the other two issues, the court determined
that the trial court correctly permitted American Standard to
collect interest at the rate set forth in the contract between the
parties as opposed to the legal rate of interest."9 The court,
however, refused to permit American Standard to include its
attorney's fees as an element of the claim secured by its lien.
Unlike interest, the General Assembly did not include
attorney's fees as one of the elements secured by the lien. 4'
138. Id.
139. Id. at 123, 425 S.E.2d at 520. Pursuant to section 6.1-330.53 of the Virginia
Code, the legal rate of interest is eight percent. That section also provides that "the
legal rate of interest shall be imposed where there is an obligation to pay interest
and no express contract to pay interest at a specified rate." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
330.53 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
The court noted that the legal rate of interest applies only in the absence of a
lawful contract rate. Where a specified rate of interest is contracted for upon an
obligation, and the rate is lawful, that rate will continue to apply after maturity of
the obligation, and even after judgment, until the debt is fully paid. The reason for
this is the court's lack of power to dispense with the obligations of lawful and valid
private contracts. 245 Va. at 122, 425 S.E.2d at 519 (citing Fleming v. Bank of Vir-
ginia, 231 Va. 299, 307, 343 S.E.2d 341, 345 (1986) (ruling that the legal rate of
interest applies only in the absence of a lawful contractual rate)).
The court was not swayed by CDH's argument that contracts giving rise to
mechanic's liens should be treated differently from other contracts providing for the
accrual of interest after maturity of the obligation because statute mechanic's liens
enjoy priority over the liens of third parties, such as deed of trust beneficiaries. 245
Va. at 123, 425 S.E.2d at 520. The court noted that the Virginia General Assembly
provided mechanic's lien claimants with this special priority. Id. Had it intended, the
General Assembly could have excluded interest as an element of the claim entitled to
special priority, but it did not do so. The forms of mechanic's liens set forth in Vir-
ginia Code §§ 3-5, -8 and -10 each include a blank for the date from which interest
is to accrue. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5, -8, -10 (Repl. Vol. 1990). In addition, § 43-22 re-
quires a claimant filing suit to enforce a lien to "file with his bill an itemized state-
ment . . . showing the amount and the character of the work done or materials fur-
nished, the prices charged therefor . . . the balance due, and the time from which
interest is claimed thereon." Id. § 43-22.
While these code sections confirm that the General Assembly intended to per-
mit a claimant to collect interest as part of its claim, they are not helpful in deter-
mining the rate at which interest should accrue. However, the court seemed unwilling
to abandon its longstanding effort to enforce parties' contracts as written for the
benefit of third party lien creditors by limiting the interest element of a mechanic's
lien claim to the legal rate of interest.
140. 245 Va. at 124, 425 S.E.2d at 521.
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Isle of Wight Materials Co., Inc. v. Cowling Bros., Inc.,'
involved putative attempts to enforce mechanic's liens. The
Virginia Supreme Court confirmed existing law by holding that
mechanic's liens are creatures of statute and the rules respect-
ing their filing and enforcement will be strictly construed."
Moss, a subcontractor, failed to pay two materialmen, Cowling
Brothers, Inc. ("Cowling") and Isle of Wight Materials Company,
Inc. ("Isle of Wight"). Both filed timely mechanic's liens against
Moss. Isle of Wight timely fied a petition to enforce its lien.
Cowling did not. Instead, Cowling claimed to be properly before
the court by virtue of having been interpleaded into the case
and, alternatively, that the interpleader tolled the statute of
limitations which would otherwise prevent it from petitioning to
enforce its lien.' The trial court hearing the interpleader ac-
tion ruled that the interpleader action acted to toll the statute
of limitations.' The trial court also recognized both Isle of
Wight's and Cowling's claims and divided certain monies inter-
plead with the court between Cowling and Isle of Wight.' On
appeal, Isle of Wight argued that Cowling had not properly
enforced its duly filed mechanic's lien as provided by stat-
ute' and that the interpleader action did not toll the statute
of limitations precluding such enforcement.'
The Virginia Supreme Court reiterated that enforcement of
mechanic's liens rests upon statutory provisions and require-
ments, not equitable principles.' The court noted that Cowl-
ing neither complied with the time limits for enforcement in
section 43-17'. nor the manner by which to enforce a lien
prescribed by section 43-22."5 The fact that Cowling was
141. 246 Va. 103, 431 S.E.2d 42 (1993).
142. Id. at 105, 431 S.E.2d at 43.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Section 43-17 of the Virginia Code provides that a lienor must bring suit
to enforce its lien within six months of filing the lien or 60 days after completion of
the structure or termination of the work, whichever is later. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17
(Repl. Vol. 1990).
146. 246 Va. at 105, 431 S.E.2d at 43.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Wallace v. Brumack, 177 Va. 36, 40, 12 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1941)
(stating that "a mechanic's lien is purely a creature of statute")).
149. Id.
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-22 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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named as a defendant in the interpleader did not satisfy the
requirement of section 43-17 that the lienor file suit to enforce
its mechanic's lien.''
The court then addressed the trial court's ruling that the
interpleader action naming Cowling as a defendant tolled the
statute of limitations on mechanic's lien enforcement. The court
noted that there are only two situations where the limitation
period would be tolled: (i) cases where liens are filed by the
general contractor and his subcontractor and (ii) cases where
the lienors become third parties to enforcement suits by filing
suits to intervene.'52 Accordingly, because Cowling did not fall
within either exception, the court decided that the trial judge
erred and that Cowling had no defense to the statute of limi-
tations asserted by Isle of Wight."s
H. Rule Against Perpetuities
In Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Hopper,'" a case of first im-
pression, the Virginia Supreme Court examined whether the
rule against perpetuities applied to an option to purchase con-
tained within a long-term commercial lease and exercisable
during the term of the lease.
In 1965, Rowena and Sparks Hopper leased a parcel of unim-
proved real property to Sun Oil Company on which Sun Oil
constructed a service station. Thereafter, Sun Oil assigned its
rights under the lease to The Southland Corporation which, in
turn, assigned its interests in the lease to Citgo Petroleum
Corporation.5 ' The fifteen-year lease provided for two five-
year renewal periods and gave the lessee "the option to pur-
chase the [leased premises] at any time during the term of the
lease or any renewal or extension thereof."" When Citgo of-
fered to exercise its option to purchase the property during the
151. 246 Va. at 106, 431 S.E.2d at 44; see Commonwealth Mechanical Contractors,
Inc. v. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan, 222 Va. 330, 332, 281 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1981).
152. 246 Va. at 107, 431 S.E.2d at 44; see Commonwealth, 222 Va. at 333, 281
S.E.2d at 812-13.
153. Id.
154. 245 Va. 363, 429 S.E.2d 6 (1993).




second renewal period, the Hoppers declined to accept, claiming
the option void as against the rule against perpetuities."'
Drawing a distinction between appendant options and options
in gross," the court held that the rule against perpetuities
did not apply to Citgo. Appendant options, such as the one con-
tained in Citgo's long-term lease, the court explained, promote
the use of property and do not violate the rule against perpetu-
ities if they are exercisable within a specified period. 59
I. Zoning
In Riles v. Board of Zoning Appeals,"6' the Board of Zoning
Appeals for the City of Roanoke (the "BZA') granted Roanoke
Mental Hygiene Services a special exception to operate a resi-
dential substance abuse group care facility for twenty-four per-
sons in an area zoned for residential use. Persons convicted of
drug-related offenses would occupy the facility and receive ther-
apy.' ' The residential use classification, however, did not per-
mit such a use. Neighbors of the facility filed a writ of certiora-
ri with the trial court and the trial court affirmed the BZA's
decision."'
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's
decision, overturning the BZA's grant of the special exception.
The court noted that in order for the BZA to grant a special
exception, it must: i) determine that special circumstances
exist; (ii) find that strict application of the zoning ordinance
157. Id.
158. Id. at 366, 429 S.E.2d at 8.
159. Id. at 365, 429 S.E.2d at 8. The court relied on section 395 of the Restate-
ment of Property which provides:
When a lease limits in favor of the lessee an option exercisable at a
time not more remote than the end of the lessee's term
(a) to purchase the whole or any part of the leased premises; or
(b) to obtain a new lease or an extension of his former lease, then
such option is effective in accordance with the terms of the limitation,
even when it may continue for longer than the maximum period [of
the rule against perpetuities].
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 395 (1944)); see RALPH C. MINOR, REAL
PROPERTY § 823 (1928).
160. 246 Va. 48, 431 S.E.2d 282 (1993).
161. Id. at 50, 431 S.E.2d at 283-84.
162. Id. at 49, 431 S.E.2d at 283.
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would produce an undue hardship; (iii) that such hardship is
not shared by other properties in the same district; and (iv)
that the granting of the special exception would not constitute a
substantial detriment to the adjacent property or change the
character of the district." In Riles, the court found no special
condition. The literal enforcement of the zoning classification
did not unreasonably restrict the use of the property.'
When asked to review the decision of a board of zoning ap-
peals to uphold the rejection of a proposed site plan, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered for the first time whether a
trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of
zoning legislation in Board of Zoning Appeals v. University
Square Associates." University Square Apartments sought a
special use permit ("SUP") from James City County to expand a
shopping center. The county board of supervisors approved the
application for the SUP including a requirement for a fifty-foot
setback along the right of way of future Route 199, a condition
recommended by the county planning commission." The
board also approved a master plan for the shopping center. The
plan depicted the 20,000 square foot building near existing
Route 199 but contained no setbacks." 7
A few days later, University Square Apartments filed a site
plan with the county zoning administrator depicting a fifty-foot
set back from existing Route 199. The zoning administrator
rejected the plan for failure to depict a fifty-foot setback from
163. Id. at 51-52, 451 S.E.2d at 284; see VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(2) (Cum. Supp.
1994). In reaching its decision, the court noted that a writ of certiorari is not a trial
de novo. The board's decision is presumed correct and the appellant has the burden
of overcoming this presumption. The board's decision may be overturned only if the
board applied erroneous principles of law or the decision was plainly wrong. See Al-
legheny Enterprises v. Covington, 217 Va. 64, 67, 225 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1976) (holding
that the evidence supported a finding that the hardship created by strict application
of a zoning ordinance to the land owners' property was self-inflicted).
164. 246 Va. at 52, 431 S.E.2d at 284-85. The court, in passing, stated that the
property had been for sale for a long period of time before Roanoke Mental Hygiene
agreed to purchase the property on the condition that the board issue a special ex-
ception permitting the use of the property as a group home. Id. This indicates that
the inability of an owner to sell a piece of property at a given price is not enough to
prove the existence of a special condition.
165. 246 Va. 290, 435 S.E.2d 385 (1993).
166. Id. at 292, 435 S.E.2d at 386.
167. Id. at 293, 435 S.E.2d at 387.
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the right of way of future Route 199." University Square
Apartments appealed the zoning administrator's decision to the
county board of zoning appeals (the "BZA") which upheld the
rejection. University Square Apartments then appealed the
BZA's decision to the trial court, filing a writ of certiorari and a
bill of complaint seeking to reverse the BZA's decision and to
obtain a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. On the
ground that the requirement for a setback from future Route
199 was "so vague and uncertain that it was totally unenforce-
able,"'69 the trial court reversed the BZA's decision. The BZA
appealed.
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to invalidate a portion of the SUP in its
review of the BZA's decision on a writ of certiorari. 7 ' "The
certiorari process does not authorize a trial court to rule on the
validity or constitutionality of legislation underlying a board of
zoning appeals decision," 7' the court explained. Under the
writ of certiorari, the court noted that the constitutionality of
the underlying zoning legislation was beyond the scope of the
trial court's review. The trial court's review was limited solely
to whether the BZA's decision was plainly wrong or based on
erroneous principles of law. 7' University Square Apartments
failed to meet this burden, the court held. It was clear that the
SUP required the fifty-foot setback from the future right of way
of Route 199, the location of which was known to University
Square Apartments.'
Steele v. Fluvanna County Board of Zoning Appeals74 dem-
onstrates the importance of a good survey. The Garretts owned
a subdivided, residential lot in Fluvanna County. Relying on a
representation from the homeowners' association for the subdi-
168. Id.
169. Id. at 293, 435 S.E.2d at 387.
170. Id. at 294, 435 S.E.2d at 388.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 295, 435 S.E.2d at 388.
173. Id. at 296, 435 S.E.2d at 388-89. The court also rejected the partnership's
argument that the BZA's requirement for the 50 foot setback from the future right of
way of Route 199 would render the site plan inconsistent with the master plan ap-
proved by the board of supervisors. The county code did not require the master plan
to show any setbacks. Id. at 297, 435 S.E.2d at 389.
174. 246 Va. 502, 436 S.E.2d 453 (1993).
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vision that the front corners of the lot were located at a tele-
phone pedestal and water meter, the Garretts constructed a
house on the lot.7 ' Subsequently, after obtaining a survey of
the lot and the completed house, the Garretts discovered that
the location of the house violated the county's ten-foot side yard
setback requirement. 76
The Board of Zoning Appeals for the County of Fluvanna (the
"BZA") granted the Garretts a variance from the setback
requirement on the grounds that withholding the variance
would cause an unnecessary hardship; the Garretts would be
required to move part of the house to comply with the setback
requirement.'77 The Steeles, the owners of the lot adjacent to
the Garretts' lot, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking
to overturn the variance. The trial court upheld the variance
and the Steeles appealed. 8 On appeal, the Steeles argued
that there was insufficient evidence upon which the BZA could
base a finding of undue hardship as required by section 15.1-
495(2) of the Virginia Code.' The Garretts argued that since
175. Id. at 504, 436 S.E.2d at 455.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 505, 436 S.E.2d at 455.
179. Id. Virginia Code § 15.1-495(2) provides as follows:
When a property owner can show that his property was acquired in good
faith and where by reason of the exceptional narrowness, shallowness,
size or shape of a specific piece of property at the time of the effective
date of the ordinance, or where by reason of exceptional topographic
conditions or other extraordinary situation or condition of such piece of
property, or of the condition, situation, or development of property imme-
diately adjacent thereto, the strict application of the terms of the ordi-
nance would effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the utilization of
the property or where the board is satisfied, upon the evidence heard by
it, that the granting of such variance will alleviate a clearly demonstra-
ble hardship approaching confiscation, as distinguished from a special
privilege or convenience sought by the applicant, provided that all vari-
ances shall be in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the
ordinance.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(2) (Cum. Supp. 1994). In addition to finding that one of
these special conditions exists, the applicant for a variance must also provide evi-
dence that the following three tests have been satisfied: (a) that the strict application
of the ordinance would produce an undue hardship; (b) that such hardship is not
shared generally by other properties in the same zoning district and the same vicini-
ty; and (c) that the authorization of the variance sought by the applicant will not be
of substantial detriment to adjacent property and that the character of the district
will not be changed by the granting of the variance. Id.; see Riles, 246 Va. 48, 51-52,
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the lot was only 100 feet in width and the corners of the lot
were incorrectly marked through no fault of their own, suffi-
cient evidence to support the variance existed."i '
The Virginia Supreme Court held that the evidence did not
support the variance.18" ' The phrase "situation or condition of
such piece of property" as used in section 15.1-495(2) refers to
the natural condition of the property, not monuments placed on
the parcel.'82 Also, the court found the hardship to be self-in-
flicted. The Garretts could have avoided the difficulty by obtain-
ing an accurate survey of the property prior to constructing the
house. As the court noted, "[A] self-inflicted hardship, whether
deliberately or ignorantly incurred, provides no basis for the
granting of a variance.""1 Instead, section 15.1-495(2), the
court explained, was intended to provide a basis for variances
where strict application of the zoning ordinance would consti-
tute an unconstitutional confiscation of the property.' A self-
inflicted hardship, therefore, cannot give rise to an unconstitu-
tional taking of an owner's rights."
In City Council of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Associates
Partnership," Potomac Greens Associates Partnership and
other interested parties ("Potomac") filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against the City of Alexandria, the City Council of
Alexandria and the Planning Commission of Alexandria (the
"City") seeking relief from the City's denial of Potomac's pro-
posed site plan for the development of a parcel of land in the
431 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1993) (denying group home for substance abuse special exemp-
tion and variance from city ordinance); Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 121, 267
S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980) (finding evidence that it was more convenient for home owner
to build an addition on one side of house rather than the other, in that the average
set-back of homes in the area was 16 feet and did not show an undo hardship enti-
tling home owner to variance from a thirty-foot set-back).
180. 246 Va. at 506-07, 436 S.E.2d at 456.
181. Id. at 507, 736 S.E.2d at 456.
182. Id.
183. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 457 (citing Allegheny Enterprises v. Covington, 217 Va. 64,
69, 225 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1976)).
184. The court noted that the extraordinary conditions listed in § 15.1-495(2) "dem-
onstrate[d] the General Assembly's intent that variances be granted only where appli-
cation of zoning restrictions would appear to be constitutionally impermissible." Id.
(citing Packer, 221 Va. at 122, 267 S.E.2d at 142).
185. Id.
186. 245 Va. 371, 429 S.E.2d 225 (1993).
19941 1129
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1101
City of Alexandria. Potomac's suit alleged that the City's denial
of its site plan was unlawful on several counts involving mat-
ters of Virginia law. Central to the dispute was the fact that
the City based its denial of the site plan on Potomac's refusal
to comply with the Transportation Management Plan Ordinance
(the "Ordinance") adopted by the City after Potomac filed its
site plan.'87 Among its arguments, Potomac claimed that the
Ordinance was invalid because the City failed to give proper
public notice of a hearing by the planning commission before
enacting the Ordinance. The parties stipulated that only one
notice was given for the Planning Commission hearing preced-
ing enactment of the Ordinance."
The trial court ruled that the City enacted the Ordinance
following proper notice but found the Ordinance unlawful on
other grounds. Both parties appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals and, thereafter, four questions went to the
Virginia Supreme Court: (i) Did the Ordinance violate Dillon's
Rule?; (ii) Was the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague?; (iii)
Was the Ordinance void due to the City's failure to give proper
notice prior to enactment?; and (iv) Did the filing of Potomac's
site plan prior to enactment of the Ordinance preclude the City
from retroactive enforcement of the Ordinance? 89
Because the other issues would be moot if the ordinance was
void ab initio, the court addressed only the third issue. Specifi-
cally, the court focused on the conflict between the municipal
law and the state law which resulted from differing provisions
in the Code of Virginia and the Alexandria City Code. The
Alexandria City Code provided for only one notice for a plan-
ning commission hearing.'O The City Charter, while specifying
the requirement for a public hearing, was silent on the notice
requirement for the planning commission. 9' Virginia Code
Section 15.1-431,19 however, provides that a planning commis-
sion cannot recommend nor can the governing body adopt an
187. Id. at 373, 429 S.E.2d at 226.
188. Id. at 376, 429 S.E.2d at 227.
189. Id. at 373-74, 429 S.E.2d at 226.
190. Id. at 377, 429 S.E.2d at 228.
191. Id.
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-431 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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ordinance without first giving notice once a week for two suc-
cessive weeks.'93
According to the court, "When a conflict exists between state
law and municipal law, state law must prevail."" The court
also recognized that the Virginia General Assembly could, by
specific intent, authorize the City to take actions which are
inconsistent with provisions of state law, but that such intent
must be expressly provided for in the City Charter.'95 The
court found no such intent. As a result, the City's failure to
give the requisite second notice prior to enactment of the Ordi-
nance rendered it void ab initio.'"
II. LEGISLATION
A. Condemnation
Municipally owned gas utility pipes, lines, and related facili-
ties have been added to the list of facilities for which lands or
easements may be obtained pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tion 33.1-119.' Additionally, effective July 1, 1994, condem-
193. Virginia Code section 15.1-431, in pertinent part, provides:
The [Planning] Commission shall not recommend nor the governing
body adopt any plan, ordinance or amendment until notice of intention to
do so has been published once a week for two successive weeks ....
The term "two successive weeks" as used in this paragraph shall mean
that such notice shall be published at least twice in such newspaper with
not less than six days elapsing between the first and second publication.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-431 (Cure. Supp. 1993).
194. 245 Va. at 378, 429 S.E.2d at 228; see City of Norfolk v. Tiny House, 222 Va.
414, 421, 281 S.E.2d 836, 840 (1981) (holding that state law must govern in conflicts
between state law and municipal law).
195. Id.; see Town of Vinton v. Falcun Corp., 226 Va. 62, 67, 306 S.E.2d 867, 870
(1983) (ruling that a town lacked authority to adopt ordinance amending local zoning
laws of emergency measure absent notice, public hearings, and referral to its plan-
ning commission).
196. Id. "Indeed, an ordinance that conflicts with a state law of general character
and state-wide application is invalid." Id.; see, e.g., Town of Vinton, supra note 193;
Hanbury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182, 185, 122 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1961) (declaring
that the city lacked power to convert the crime of forgery to a misdemeanor since
Commonwealth made forgery a felony).
197. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 332, 1994 Va. Acts 462 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-898 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). Virginia Code section 33.1-119 permits the expedited
acquisition and possession of land to permit the construction of highways. VA. CODE
ANN. § 33.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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nation awards deposited with the court pursuant to Virginia
Code section 33.1-128 will accrue interest at the general ac-
count composite rate,' compiled by the Department of the
Treasury of Virginia for the month in which the award is ren-
dered." Any interest accrued between July 1, 1981 and July
1, 1994 will be paid at the rate of eight percent.2"
Furthermore, the authority of school boards to condemn land
for school purposes has been increased pursuant to amended
Virginia Code section 22.1-127. °1 A school board now has the
same right of entry as a county, city, or town, pursuant to
section 25-232.1 of the Virginia Code, to determine the suitabil-
ity of land for school purposes.2"'
B. Condominiums
The General Assembly amended section 55-79.74:1, making it
clear that the names and addresses of the owners of units in a
condominium must be made available for examination by all of
the unit owners.0 3 A condominium unit owner must now fur-
nish to the contract purchaser of the owner's unit a copy of the
owners' association's current budget or budget summary pre-
pared by the association in addition to the other documents
required by Virginia Code section 55-79.97.2o4
C. Deeds of Trust
The owner of the beneficial title to property under a deed of
trust may extend the twenty year limitation period for enforce-
ment of the deed of trust encumbering the property for an addi-
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-120 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
199. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 584, 1994 Va. Acts 835 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
33.1-128 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-128 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
201. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 786, 1994 Va. Acts 17 (codified at VA. CODE. ANN. §
22.1-127 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). Comdenation proceedings generally are governed by
Virginia Code §§ 25-46.1 to -46.36. Eminent domain and damages are governed by
Virginia Code §§ 33.1-89 to -136.
202. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-127 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
203. Id. § 55-79.74:1; Act of Apr. 8, 1994, ch. 463, 1994 Va. Acts 71 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.74:1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.97(AX5) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
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tional twenty years by filing a certificate in the clerk's office in
which the deed of trust is recorded.2"5 Virginia Code section
8.01-241.1 sets forth the permissible form of the certificate."9
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 55-
59(9) to clarify that a substitute trustee is vested with all of
the rights granted to the original trustees in a deed of trust
upon the noteholder's execution of an instrument appointing the
substitute trustee."7 The instrument appointing the substitute
trustee must be recorded in the clerk's office where the original
deed of trust is recorded before the substitute trustee records
any instrument pursuant to which the substitute trustee exer-
cises any of the rights or powers conferred upon him by the
deed of trust."9
D. Foreclosures
The General Assembly also added property owners' associa-
tions, condominium unit owners' associations and proprietary
lessees' associations holding liens against property targeted for
foreclosure to the list of parties who must be given notice of the
proposed foreclosure sale. Virginia Code section 55-59.1 now
provides that if a condominium unit owners' association, proper-
ty owners' association or proprietary lessees' association files a
lien against the property at least thirty days prior to the
proposed sale, notice of the sale to those lienholders is manda-
tory.20
9
E. Landlord and Tenant
New section 55-225.1210 prohibits a landlord from willfully
interfering with utilities or services required to be provided to a
residential tenant pursuant to a rental agreement or interfering
205. Id. § 8.01-241 (Cure. Supp. 1994).
206. Id. § 8.01-241.1.
207. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 551, 1994 Va. Acts 773 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-59(9) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59(9) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
209. Id. § 55-59.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
210. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 583, 1994 Va. Acts 835 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-225.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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with the tenant's access to the property, except pursuant to the
execution of a writ of possession."' If the landlord violates
section 55-255.1 and the tenant occupies residential premises,
the tenant may either regain possession of the premises and
obtain an order requiring the resumption of the interrupted ser-
vices or terminate the lease.2 In either case, the tenant is
entitled to recover his actual damages and reasonable attorney's
fees. 2
13
Beginning January 1, 1995, landlords subject to the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act must accrue interest on
deposits posted by tenants at a rate equal to the Federal Re-
serve Board discount rate as of January 1 of each year.214 The
General Assembly made it clear that the interest begins to
accrue as of the effective date of the rental agreement, even
though the tenant may not be entitled to the interest if the
landlord does not hold the deposit for a period exceeding thir-
teen months after the date of the rental agreement. 5
F. Mechanic's Liens
New Virginia Code section 43-13.32" requires the owner of
one or two family residential dwellings to provide the purchaser
of the property an affidavit stating that all persons performing
work or supplying materials to the property within 120 days
prior to the date of settlement have been paid in full. If such
persons have not been paid in full, the owner must provide the
name, address, and amount payable to or claimed by any per-
son performing labor or furnishing material, and with whom
the seller is in privity of contract.2" Any willful misrepresen-
tation in the affidavit resulting in monetary loss to any finan-
211. Id.
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 55.225.2 (Cure. Supp. 1994).
213. Id.
214. Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 402, 1994 Va. Acts 575 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-248.11 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.11B (Cum. Supp. 1994).
216. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 388, 1994 Va. Acts 565 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
43-13.3 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
217. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-13.3 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
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cial institution, title company, or the purchaser constitutes a
class three misdemeanor.21 s
Virginia Code section 43_1219 now states that any Virginia
attorney, any company authorized to write title insurance in
Virginia, or any financial institution authorized to provide
banking services in Virginia "may perform mechanics' lien
agent services as any legal entity."' °
G. Recordation of Instruments
New section 55-66.1:01 permits either the assignor or assign-
ee of a note secured by a deed of trust to record a certificate of
assignment of the note in the clerk's office where the deed of
trust is recorded." The certificate must be signed by the as-
signor, transferror or endorser.' Section 55-66.1:01 sets forth
a permissible form of the certificate of assignment.'
Writings will be recorded in circuit courts as to any party
whose original signature is on the writing and acknowledged by
the signatory or two witness.' Signatures of parties acting
on behalf of another may be acknowledged or proved in the
same manner.2
The General Assembly provided new examples of the permis-
sible form for certificates of satisfaction and certificates of par-
tial satisfaction are in Virginia Code section 55-66.4:1.'
218. Id.
219. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 382, 1994 Va. Acts 558 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
43-1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
220. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
221. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 812, 1994 Va. Acts 1259 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-66.1:01 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.1:01 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
223. Id.
224. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 554, 1994 Va. Acts 776 (codified at VA. CODE ANN §
55-106 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). A signature may also be made before the clerk of court
or his deputy or acknowledged in a manner proscribed in Virginia Code §§ 55-113 to
-115, §§ 55-118.1 to -118.9, and §§ 55-119 to -121.
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-106 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
226. Id. § 55-66.4:1. Any release by a certificate of satisfaction or certificate of
partial satisfaction must comply with Virginia Code sections 55-66.3, 55-66.3:1 and
55-66.4. Id. §§ 55-66.3, .3:1, .4 (Repl. Vol. 1986 and Cum. Supp. 1994).
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Only one fee may now be charged for recording a certificate
of satisfaction that releases the original deed of trust and any
corrected or revised deeds of trust. 7
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-
446 to include the requirement that a judgment state that it is
a judgment for money in a specific amount, in favor of a named
party, or against a named party or with that party's address, if
known." The judgment must also state the time from which
the judgment bears interest."
H. Subdivision Plats
Roads within the secondary system of highways may now be
vacated under either of the two methods set forth in Virginia
Code section 15.1-482Y The roads may be vacated if the land
shown on the plat to be vacated was the subject of a rezoning
or special exception application approved after a public hearing
held in compliance with section 15.1-431. The vacation must be
necessary, however, to implement a proffer accepted by the
governing body or to implement a condition to the approval of a
special exception."
I. Taxation
Amended section 58.1-33402 now provides a mechanism for
purchasers of a portion of a tax parcel to apply the sales pro-
ceeds to any unpaid taxes and levies assessed against the prop-
erty. Purchasers can have their portion of the parcel relieved of
227. Acts of Mar. 10, 1994; Apr. 8, 9 & 20, 1994, chs. 64, 432, 498, 842, 1994 Va.
Acts 138, 604, 702, 1328 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-112(2) (Cum. Supp.
1994)). The recordation fee permitted under Virginia Code section 14.1-112(2) is thir-
teen dollars for up to four pages plus one dollar for each page in excess of four. VA.
CODE ANN. § 14.1-112(2) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
228. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 538, 1994 Va. Acts 764 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-446 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
229. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-446 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
230. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 341, 1994 Va. Acts 472 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-482 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
231. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-482 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
232. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 386, 1994 Va. Acts 562 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
58.1-3340 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
1136
PROPERTY LAW
the tax lien to the extent that the sales proceeds exceed its pro
rata share of the taxes.'
The General Assembly also enacted legislation providing that
real estate taxes for property in land use must be paid on June
1 rather than November 1 if the property is to remain in land
use. ' The treasurer where the property is located is required
to give notice of the delinquent taxes to the owner by April 1 of
the year."
The General Assembly expanded the scope of the localities
that may provide partial exemptions to include not only those
properties that have been rehabilitated, but also those proper-
ties that have undergone substantial renovation or replace-
ment." No partial exemption, however, is available if rehabil-
itation of commercial or industrial property is achieved through
demolition and replacement of historic property."
Pursuant to an addition to Virginia Code section 58.1-
3506A.20,s furniture, office equipment, and maintenance
equipment owned and used by a homeowners' association, for
the purpose of maintaining or using open or common space,
may be taxed as a separate class of personal property. 9
Meanwhile, revised section 58.1-3965' requires that, as a
condition to foreclosing its lien for delinquent real estate taxes,
233. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3340 (Cum. Supp. 1994). The pro-rated share of the
taxes is based on the relation of the purchase price of the portion of the parcel ac-
quired to the most recent assessed value of the entire tax parcel. The treasurer or
other officer of the taxing authority shall be responsible for releasing the lien on the
purchaser's portion of the tax parcel upon payment of the tax allocable to the ac-
quired property. Id.
234. Act of Apr. 2, 1994, ch. 199, 1994 Va. Acts 290 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
58.1-3235 (Cune. Supp. 1994)).
235. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3235 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
236. Acts of Apr. 7, 8 & 10, 1994, chs. 424, 435, 608, 1994 Va. Acts 597, 625, 876
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221(E) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
237. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221(E) (Cum. Supp. 1994). This is consistent with
similar provisions designed to protect residential, hotel and motel historic properties;
see id. §§ 58.1-3220(E) and -3220.1(E).
238. Acts of Apr. 2, 4 & 10, 1994, chs. 171, 221, 266, 631, 1994 Va. Acts 265, 316,
365, 904 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506 (Cure. Supp. 1994)).
239. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(AX20) (Cum. Supp. 1994); see id. § 58.1-3284.1
(Repl. Vol. 1991).
240. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 884, 1994 Va. Acts 1469 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-3965 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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the locality entitled to the lien must first give thirty days no-
tice to the owner, any trustee under a deed of trust, mortgagee
or lien creditor interested in the property.2" Beneficiaries, lien
creditors and trustees under deeds of trust, mortgages or other
security interests securing financial institutions, however, must
be made party defendants in the suit to enforce the lien. 2
The General Assembly also reduced from one year to ninety
days the period during which a party served by publication may
petition the court to have the lien enforcement case re-
heard.'
Though taxes delinquent for twenty years or more are barred
and canceled, Virginia Code section 58.1-3441 stipulates that
taxes deferred by ordinance' are not considered delinquent
during the pendency of such deferral, and will therefore remain
valid for twenty years plus any period afforded by the defer-
ral.2'
J. Virginia Property Owners' Association Act
Revised section 55-513B2' provides that the amount of
charges assessed against a unit owner in response to the unit
owner's violation of the declaration is not limited to the amount
of damage or expense incurred by the association.2"7 The
charges still may not exceed fifty dollars for a single offense
and ten dollars a day for a continuing offense. "
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965 (Cum. Supp. 1994). The notice to the trustee,
mortgagee or lien creditor is only required if the trustee, mortgagee or lien creditor
has not been made a party defendant pursuant to Virginia Code § 58.1-3967; see id.
§ 58.1-3967.
242. Id. § 58.1-3967 (Cum. Supp. 1994). Beneficiaries who are not financial institu-
tions must only be noticed of the sale pursuant to section 58.1-3965.
243. Id.
244. Deferrals must be enacted in conformity with Virginia Code §§ 58.1-3210 to
3218 or §§ 58.1-3219 to 3219.3 (Repl. Vol. 1991 and Cum. Supp. 1994).
245. Id. § 58.1-3341 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
246. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 368, 1994 Va. Acts 536 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-513 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).




K. Virginia Real Estate Time-Share Act
The Virginia General Assembly made numerous amendments
to the Virginia Time Share Act (the "Act"), 49 including adding
definitions of "additional land," "alternative purchase," "inciden-
tal benefit," "product," "situs," "situs time-share act," and "time-
share estate occupancy expense."' New section 55-364.1"'
includes a list of terms that describe a time-share and must be
included in the name of the project to identify it as suchY2
Section 55-367(A) now requires a time-share instrument to
include additional representations regarding the addition or
deletion of incidental benefits' and alternative purchases,2
and the extent to which the project may be added to or re-
moved from the developer's time-share program. 5
Management agreements executed during the developer con-
trol period are no longer void after two years, but are voidable
by the association.' Section 55-369B 7 now permits the de-
veloper to convey to the association fee simple title to phases of
the project.
Time-share associations are now empowered to foreclose the
lien for assessments against time-share units as if the lien were
a deed of trust.'
249. Id. §§ 55-360 to -400 (Rep. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
250. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 580, 1994 Va. Acts 821 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-362 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
251. Id. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 580, 1994 Va. Acts 823 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-364.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-367(AX1) (Cure. Supp. 1994).
253. Id. § 55-367(AX15).
254. Id. § 55-367(AX16).
255. Id. § 55-367(AX17). Disclosures regarding incidental benefits, alternative pur-
chases and whether or not the developer has reserved the right to add or delete
either of the foregoing must also be included in the public offering statement. Id. §
55-374(AX1Xf) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
256. Id. § 55-368.3.
257. Id. § 55-369(B).
258. Acts of Apr. 8 & 9, 1994, chs. 432, 580, 1994 Va. Acts 618, 825 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-370 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). The foreclosure must occur within two
years following the perfection of the lien and in accordance with the Virginia Code.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59, -59.1 to -59.4 and -60 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
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Several sections of the Act presently afford fuller disclosure
to both existing time-share owners and potential owners. The
annual report for each project must include additional disclo-
sures, including a copy of the current budget for the projectY9
The developer must provide a potential purchaser with a public
offering statement prior to the execution of a purchase con-
tract."8 Public offering statements now must make it clear
that the statement need not include information about the
developer's other time-share projects, unless the other projects
are included in the same time-share program and marketed
jointly.26' The General Assembly expanded other disclosure re-
quirements for the public offering statement.262
L. Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act
Homebuilders must now disclose in writing all known materi-
al defects which would constitute a building code violation be-
fore acceptance of the purchase contract when selling an exist-
ing structure, or after issuance of a certificate of occupancy
when selling a partially constructed dwelling.' Disclosure,
however, is not required if the builder is unaware of the de-
fects.2
M. Warranties
Home purchasers may waive, modify or exclude any or all
express and implied warranties on new homes, only if the
words "as is" are conspicuously' displayed on the purchase
259. Id. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 580, 1994 Va. Acts 827 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-370.1(BX6) (Cum. Supp. 1994)). The budget must disclose: (1) who prepared
it, (2) the occupancy assumptions used when preparing the budget, (3) a description
of repair and replacement reserves, (4) the anticipated common expense liability of
each time-share estate owner, (5) a statement of any services provided by the devel-
oper but not included in the budget, and (6) a statement of the developer as to what
expenses it expects will become common expense liabilities. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
370.1B.6a to .6f (Cum. Supp. 1994).
260. Id. § 55-374(A).
261. Id.
262. Id. § 55-374.
263. Act of Mar. 10, 1994, ch. 80, 1994 Va. Acts 173 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-518(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
264. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-518(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
265. See id. § 8.1-201(10) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994) (defining "conspicu-
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contract in capital letters at least two points larger than the
type in the contract.'
Home purchasers are also now able to bring direct causes of
action against manufacturers of fire-retardant treated plywood
sheathing or other roof sheathing material used in their homes
for any breach of warranty, even if a manufacturer's warranty
limits the right of third parties. 7
N. Water and Sewer Liens
The General Assembly clarified when counties may impose
liens for water and sewer charges on residential rental real
estate by amending Virginia code section 15.1-295.' The sec-
tion now provides that no lien will attach to residential rental
real estate unless the user of the water or sewer services is
also the owner of the property, or unless the owner negotiated
or executed the water or sewer service agreement. 9
Liens for unpaid charges of water and sewer authorities now
rank on a parity with liens for unpaid real estate taxes. °
Water and sewer authorities may require a locality to collect
amounts due on properly recorded utility liens in the same
manner as unpaid real estate taxes due to the locality.27'
0. Zoning
Current law provides that, upon the filing of a petition by a
party aggrieved by any decision of a board of zoning appeals,
the board must file a return in which it sets forth the facts and
ous").
266. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cumn. Supp. 1994).
267. Act of Apr. 8, 1994, ch. 483, 1994 Va. Acts 681 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-70.1(G) (Cur. Supp. 1994)).
268. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 627, 1994 Va. Acts 901 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-295 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1994)). Rockingham County was added to the
list of counties that may provide that taxes and charges on water and sewer lines be
designated a lien on the real estate served by such lines. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-295
(Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
269. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-295 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
270. Acts of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 599 and 602, 1994 Va. Acts 859 & 863 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1263(a) (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1994)).
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1263(a).
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materials used to make its decision.272 Virginia Code section
15.1-497 now provides that if such an appeal is withdrawn by
the petitioner subsequent to the board's filing of the return, the
board may ask the court to decide whether the appeal was
frivolous, and thereby force the petitioner to pay the board's
cost in making the return.27
Purchasers of residential property in areas affected by above
average noise levels from aircraft should find comfort in two
additions to the Virginia Code. New section 15.1-491.03274 pro-
vides that local governing bodies may enforce building regula-
tions relating to the provision of acoustical treatment measures
in structures for which building permits are issued after Janu-
ary 1, 1995.275 Regulations for the installation of such treat-
ment measures must be promulgated by the Board of Housing
and Community Development by October 1, 1994.276
In addition to the other notice requirement of section 15.1-
431,277 where a proposed comprehensive plan, amendment to
such a plan, change in zoning map classification, or an appli-
cation for a special exception or variance affects a parcel of
land located within one-half mile of an adjoining county or
municipality. Written notice must be given to the chief adminis-
trative officer of the adjoining county or municipality at least
ten days before the hearing.27
A county, city or town without a zoning ordinance may pro-
vide by ordinance that a person seeking to establish a detention
272. Id. § 15.1-497.
273. Id.
274. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 745, 1994 Va. Acts 1136 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-491.03 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
275. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.03 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
276. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 745, 1994 Va. Acts 1126 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-99.10:1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). In establishing its regulations, governing bodies may
adopt one or more noise overlay zones as an amendment to its zoning map and es-
tablish measures for treating the noise. After January 1, 1995, however, a statement
must be placed on all subdivision plats and site plans giving notice if the property
lies either wholly or partially in a noise overlay zone. Any such amendments to exist-
ing zoning maps must provide a process for reasonable notice to affected property
owners. No existing property use will be considered a non-conforming use because of
such amendments. Id.
277. Act of April 11, 1994, ch. 774, 1994 Va. Acts 1181 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-431 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1994)).
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-431 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
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home, group home, residential care facility for children in need
of services, or home for delinquent youth must first provide
notice of the proposed use and participate in a public hearing
as set forth in Virginia Code section 15.1-503.4.279
III. CONCLUSION
Over the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
a number of important issues affecting Virginia property law,
including the visibility of activities upon land necessary to es-
tablish title by adverse possession, the effect of a deed of trust
executed by one tenant in common upon the interest of another
tenant in common, the applicability of Virginia's five day pay or
quit statute to a non-residential lease, and the actions that
must be taken by a mechanic's lienor to properly enforce its
lien.
The Virginia General Assembly continued to modify and
refine the Virginia Condominium Act and the Virginia PropertyOwners' Association Act. The increasingly important roles that
both homeowners' associations and condominium associations
play in modern life are reflected by the General Assembly's
extension of notice obligations under the non-judicial deed of
trust foreclosure statutes to associations benefitted by perfected
liens for assessments.
279. Id. § 15.1-503.4 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
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